Flying? Remove Shoes, No Liquids, Bend Over Please...

[Slainte Mhath]

From the "You can't even make this shit up" department:

Apparently some nutjob in Saudi Arabi tried to assassinate a Saudi prince by detonating explosives he'd jammed up his own ass. Big deal right? Well someone at Homeland Security has been paying attention, and thinks it could be a threat to airline security.

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/09/ass_bomber.html

http://www.hlswatch.com/2009/09/18/anal-secrets-and-the-coming-tempest-in-homeland-security/

Seriously, the have a machine called The B.O.S.S. they can use to scan the body cavities of prison inmates. Millions of people are subjected to shoe scans daily thanks to a single moron who tried to use a crude device in his shoe years ago. Millions more people are no longer allowed to carry on liquids thanks to some geniuses that tried to use that ploy awhile back as well. Is it really too farfetched to think that the BOSS scan may be the next line we need to wait in before boarding?

Ridiculous and far-fetched I know, but then, it i the U.S. Government we're talking about... Come fly the friendly skies!

[Houngan]

The liquid ban was based on a rumor, not an attempt, IIRC.

H.

[Tankero]

It's a good thing Colombians aren't jihaddists. My countrymen have been smuggling all sorts of things onto airliners for the past three decades. Exhibit A. (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0390221/)

I'm sure someone has written some Jingoist piece of drivel about someone eating explosives that detonate when digested. As for the liquid thing, wasn't that based on Die Hard 3?

[RyanMichael]

The liquid ban was based on a rumor, not an attempt, IIRC.

H.

Nope, thwarted attempt.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plot

[WarrenM]

Airplane travel can't die soon enough. Unfortunately, it can't die before there's something to replace it. Teleportation? Space ladders? Whatever the hell it is, make it happen so I never have to set foot in a fucking airport ever again.

We've got a trip planned in Dec and my #1 concern about it is dealing with the airlines.

[Kraaze]

Airplane travel can't die soon enough. Unfortunately, it can't die before there's something to replace it. Teleportation? Space ladders? Whatever the hell it is, make it happen so I never have to set foot in a fucking airport ever again.

We've got a trip planned in Dec and my #1 concern about it is dealing with the airlines.

There is nothing wrong with airplane travel. There's everything wrong with the security theater which leads to all the absurdities in airports.

[WarrenM]

There is nothing wrong with airplane travel.
Dude.

[AaronSofaer]

Amusingly, Israel has much better security and much less security theatre.

It works kinda like this...

In Amtrak, they check your ID, but they don't look in your bags. In Israel, they look in your bags, but they don't check your ID.

[Houngan]

Nope, thwarted attempt.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plot

Mea culpa, thanks.

H.

[Kraaze]

Dude.

If you could just stroll up to your airplane five minutes before the flight was scheduled to start boarding, buy a ticket and hand someone your bag, then hop on the plane and settle in right before takeoff would you still hate airplane travel? That would remove like 90% of the irritants for me.

[Houngan]

Amusingly, Israel has much better security and much less security theatre.

It works kinda like this...

In Amtrak, they check your ID, but they don't look in your bags. In Israel, they look in your bags, but they don't check your ID.

Do what now? Isn't it somewhere around 4 hours to get through security at an Israeli airport?

H.

[WarrenM]

That would remove like 90% of the irritants for me.
The seats would still be cramped, the food would still suck, and the flight would still be delayed by 5 minutes more then necessary for you to miss your connection. I hate flying. It's something I endure to get to fun locations.

[Kraaze]

The seats would still be cramped, the food would still suck, and the flight would still be delayed by 5 minutes more then necessary for you to miss your connection. I hate flying. It's something I endure to get to fun locations.

Fair enough, I think we just prioritize the irritants differently. I hate losing the extra time required for airport rigamarole and security theater.

[WarrenM]

I hate losing the extra time required for airport rigamarole and security theater.
Don't get me wrong, I would LOVE to see the security circus go away. It would improve my experience by an order of magnitude but it certainly wouldn't raise it to the level of "acceptable" or anything approaching it.

[Kraaze]

Don't get me wrong, I would LOVE to see the security circus go away. It would improve my experience by an order of magnitude but it certainly wouldn't raise it to the level of "acceptable" or anything approaching it.

Keep in mind the indirect effects. The security theater is funded in part by the airport, which passes the costs onto the airlines via gate fees, ramp fees, landing fees, etc. If the airport sillines gets back under control, it might give the airlines a little more financial breathing room to fix the things about airline travel that they know full-well their customers hate.

[extarbags]

Amusingly, Israel has much better security and much less security theatre.

It works kinda like this...

In Amtrak, they check your ID, but they don't look in your bags. In Israel, they look in your bags, but they don't check your ID.

Amtrak?

[Houngan]

Amtrak?

Shhhh. Grandpa's trying to sleep, dreaming of iron horses that cross the plains.

Seriously though, I'd love to have some high-speed rail, if they do it right. Give me a real chair and a place to have a drink and watch the world go by, and I'm a happy man. I'm not exactly a monster but my shoulders are two inches wider on each side than Southwest's seats. I feel like a serial killer when I fly, stalking the rows looking for kids small enough that I can be comfortable but not so small they'll want to yammer in my ear. That, or a little latino grandmother, they fit well.

H.

[goodgimp]

I'm 6'7" and of a medium build. I like to travel, but O Gods, the pain that is flying from Salt Lake City to Madrid...

[WarrenM]

I'm 6'5" and it's painful enough for me. It's gotten to the point now where I need to tap the shoulder of the person who sits in front of me before we take off and ask them to please not put their seat back because I need the 1/4" of space I have for my knees to fit. I can't even imagine 6'7"...

[Phil_Stein]

For those decrying "security theatre", or far more properly, "security theater", what aspects of current U.S. airport/airline security would you dispense with?

[Tim Partlett]

Amusingly, Israel has much better security and much less security theatre.

It works kinda like this...

In Amtrak, they check your ID, but they don't look in your bags. In Israel, they look in your bags, but they don't check your ID.

Eh? I flew El Al and found Israel's airport security polite, friendly, but very, very thorough. They most certainly did check my ID, several times, and asked me about it repeatedly, the same questions asked by different people in different ways. They also profiled me pretty obviously too - being a lone male under 40 made me (I think) the second next highest threat after a lone Arab male.

[jeffd]

For those decrying "security theatre", or far more properly, "security theater", what aspects of current U.S. airport/airline security would you dispense with?

The limits on carrying on liquids, for starters.

[Kraaze]

For those decrying "security theatre", or far more properly, "security theater", what aspects of current U.S. airport/airline security would you dispense with?

All of them. Seriously. They all suffer from being easily beaten and what minimal effectiveness they have is certainly not justifying the massive direct and indirect costs.

[Hanzii]

Eh? I flew El Al and found Israel's airport security polite, friendly, but very, very thorough. They most certainly did check my ID, several times, and asked me about it repeatedly, the same questions asked by different people in different ways. They also profiled me pretty obviously too - being a lone male under 40 made me (I think) the second next highest threat after a lone Arab male.

Not to mention that BOSS-machine... no, they don't have that. What they do have is rubber gloves.
Female friend of mine got the full body cavity search (I don't remember if it was El Al or just Israeli security forces) because they didn't like how much she traveled between Israel and Gaza while there and when she got angry and mentioned she was a personal friend of the ambassador and that somebody's job would be in jeopardy if she missed her plane, they just grounded her plane.
The 200 other passengers sure did applaud, when she arrived and they were cleared 2 hours later.

So yes, El Al has excellent security and isn't as focused on putting on a pretend show with undertrained and underpaid security personel - but it's not because it's a kinder gentler or more pleasant security.

A local stand-up comedian had a bit where he wished he would be allowed to make the Fuck-It Airways where you were allowed to drive on to the runway, just wade on the plane carrying however many guns you wanted. If everybody accepted the same risk and a fair number was armed it was a risk worth taking to shave off the most time consuming and unpleasant part of airtravel.

[Phil_Stein]

The limits on carrying on liquids, for starters.

Well, we've seen by the link above that there was a real plot to utilize liquids to blow up airplanes.

I certainly don't know enough about the chemistry to be sure how viable such a plot might have been. But considering that the plotters at least seem to have believed in their plot, what counter-evidence do you have that such a thing is unrealistic?

[BaconTastesGood]

I'm 6'5" and it's painful enough for me. It's gotten to the point now where I need to tap the shoulder of the person who sits in front of me before we take off and ask them to please not put their seat back because I need the 1/4" of space I have for my knees to fit. I can't even imagine 6'7"...

If you fly Airtran you can pay $20 and get an emergency row seat (whereas other airlines you have to ask, which kills me because I see grandmas and kids in these rows somehow until a flight attendant is like "Oh, wait, you're not allowed to sit there").

[Phil_Stein]

All of them. Seriously. They all suffer from being easily beaten and what minimal effectiveness they have is certainly not justifying the massive direct and indirect costs.

Is that a real answer?

No metal detectors, ID checks, baggage screening? Nothing?

Allow folks to walk onto planes with concealed firearms, anything they want in their bags, etc?

If in fact you are not in favor of such an approach, then please be far more clear about what aspects of current security you would do away with.

[BaconTastesGood]

I certainly don't know enough about the chemistry to be sure how viable such a plot might have been. But considering that the plotters at least seem to have believed in their plot, what counter-evidence do you have that such a thing is unrealistic?

The issue isn't realism, it's whether the efforts made are actually effective in the long run particularly versus the costs.

Put another way -- there is no doubt that thousands of lives would be saved every year if we had mandatory roadblocks and breathalyzers every evening from 9pm until 5am. I'm not sure how well that would go over.

[Kraaze]

Is that a real answer?


Yes. Seriously seriously.


No metal detectors, ID checks, baggage screening? Nothing?

Allow folks to walk onto planes with concealed firearms, anything they want in their bags, etc?


I wouldn't suggest allowing it, I'd suggest we stop wasting time screwing around with ineffective steps to stop people determined to do these things even when they are prohibited.

[Phil_Stein]

BTG - If in fact, a liquid bomb can be assembled fairly readily, and the bombers' plot was realistic, then it certainly seems worth it to me to exchange one convenience (being able to carry large bottles of liquid onto a plane) for something else (greater safety for me personally, as well as reduced risk for society as a whole - the repercussions and costs of 9/11 went well beyond those who died on the planes.)

Obviously, we face lots of risk/reward tradeoffs throughout life, and governments and individuals don't always get the equation right. But without a detailed understanding of the risk in question, it seems rather silly to criticize the decision on liquids.

[Phil_Stein]

I wouldn't suggest allowing it, I'd suggest we stop wasting time screwing around with ineffective steps to stop people determined to do these things even when they are prohibited.

So are you just playing semantic games now?

You're only against the "ineffective steps", but not "allowing it" in the broad sense of several specific things I listed?

Since you seem to have a very clear picture in your mind of which steps are ineffective, but also seem to be saying (or maybe not - it's hard to parse your comments) that not all steps are ineffective, please share with us a list of which steps are effective and which are ineffective.

[Hanzii]

The risk of anybody getting enough of the right kinds of liquids aboard a plane and be able to construct a bomb capable of any real damage was already infinitesimal with the old rules in place. The no liquid rule has cost millions in delay and added security costs for no reason at all.

It's also impossible to hide a big enough bomb in shoes.

I don't agree we should get rid of it all, but Bacon is right. On the roads we accept a fucking huge number of preventable deaths, because it makes our lives and especially industry run smoother for it... but when it comes to airtravel we'll keep inventing stupid safety measures and make what is already the most loathsome form of travel even worse.

[Phil_Stein]

The shoe thing is a trivial hassle, IMO. I don't know what the risks are, but at least one individual thought it was viable enough to attempt this method.

The liquid thing - do you have a link to something written by someone who really understands this well and plays this risk off as effectively insignificant?

[WarrenM]

Trivial? It slows down the line by an order of magnitude. What can be put into a shoe that I can't sew into the lining of my pants or shirt or anywhere else for that matter? Better have everyone strip down naked because that's the only way to be sure. And cavity searches.

The shoe/belt thing is pointless, get rid of it.

[Phil_Stein]

An order of magnitude?

10X?

Not my experience - sorry. Adds maybe 15 seconds to take your shoes off, 30-60 seconds to put them back on.

I don't understand the security issue involved - what you can conceal in your shoes that you can't conceal elsewhere, and that the regular machines won't detect. But the inconvenience, for me, isn't all that great.

[WarrenM]

Adds maybe 15 seconds to take your shoes off, 30-60 seconds to put them back on.
45 seconds per person, multiplied by thousands. It sucks, Phil.

Worse than that, it accomplishes absolutely nothing.

[Phil_Stein]

Warren, as with the other issues, I would ask you to point to someone who is reasonably authoritative on such issues who discounts the security risk.

i.e. I can reasonably easily see the inconvenience effect of various measures upon myself. I can't readily assess the security side of things - I lack the expertise. I assume the government DOES have experts in such things. It's certainly possible that the government has miscalculated the risk vs. inconvenience/cost factor, but since I can only really observe one side of the equation, I'm in a poor position to state that this IS the case for any one of the particular measures.

Many here seem confident in their opinions that some or many such security measures ARE a waste. If they have formed those opinions based on an assessment of both sides of the equation (i.e. including a real and accurate assessment of the security risk), then I'd be interested in reading some of the sources that convinced them.

Or, you know, it might just be random, ill-informed internet complaining about the government.

[WarrenM]

Yeah, maybe I'm a ranting lunatic, I dunno. It just doesn't pass my internal bullshit filter, that's all.

I mean, have they ever found anything of consequence as a result of these checks or is it all sold on the basis of deterrence?

[Phil_Stein]

Warren - I don't know. What I'm aware of is that for two of the issues that annoy at least some folks (the shoe thing and the liquids thing), the policies were, I think, implemented after apparently real live plots to use these methods were uncovered/attempted.

I don't follow these issues all that closely. I don't know if the US and/or foreign governments would necessarily disclose information on thwarted attempts. And, as you suggest, there's likely deterrence value in any case.

Again, I'm not saying that some of the security measures aren't annoying. They are, though, IMO, not nearly so much as some folks make them out to be, and there are plenty of things about airline travel that are annoying that have little or nothing to do with security.

And I'm not suggesting that it's impossible for the government to be wrong about these things, nor that we should not take into account both relative risk and relative cost/inconvenience.

But to accurately discuss the value of various measures, we would need to understand not only the part that's fairly obvious to most travelers (the inconvenience), but also the part that is not so obvious (the risk). Again, the government doesn't even necessarily have a monopoly on risk assessment. I'd be willing to read the opinions and/or presented facts of non-government experts on these topics. But so far in this thread, I don't think anybody has backed up the anti-"security theater" side of the discussion with solid evidence on risks (or lack thereof).

[Brad Wardell]

This sort of thing is one of the reasons why I fly less and less.

I can't give a rational reason for this but taking off my shoes and taking my laptop out of the bag are two things that just really annoy me to the point of not wanting to use air travel.

[Tim Partlett]

Not to mention that BOSS-machine... no, they don't have that.

Actually... at the border, where I crossed from Jordan into the West Bank, they did have this weird walk-in device, a bit like a metal detector, which blew some kind of gas onto me from a dozen or so little vents. I asked what it was, but they weren't letting on.

Female friend of mine got the full body cavity search (I don't remember if it was El Al or just Israeli security forces) because they didn't like how much she traveled between Israel and Gaza while there and when she got angry and mentioned she was a personal friend of the ambassador and that somebody's job would be in jeopardy if she missed her plane, they just grounded her plane.

She's lucky they grounded the plane for her. They give plenty of warnings, on the tickets, on the web site, etc. that you should give plenty of time, at least four hours, for security. I got everything but the cavity search, and I still had plenty of time to shop in Ben Gurion's duty free shops.

[Lorini]

This (http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-screen16nov16,0,4108424.story) is the problem.

"The investigators smuggled the components of potentially devastating liquid bombs past checkpoints at 19 airports nationwide earlier this year, they testified. In the covert tests, they carried the elements of an improvised explosive device and a firebomb in carry-on luggage or on their bodies. "

What TSA is doing is mostly bullshit to make the American public think that the planes are safe. They aren't, so why not get rid of the bullshit and let us get on the plane faster?

[WarrenM]

This sort of thing is one of the reasons why I fly less and less.

I can't give a rational reason for this but taking off my shoes and taking my laptop out of the bag are two things that just really annoy me to the point of not wanting to use air travel.
I agree with you but until something else comes along you're sort of boned for destinations that are over a few hundred miles away.

[shift6]

Actually... at the border, where I crossed from Jordan into the West Bank, they did have this weird walk-in device, a bit like a metal detector, which blew some kind of gas onto me from a dozen or so little vents. I asked what it was, but they weren't letting on.
They have these in McCarren airport (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA) as well. From the fact that they make me take off any coat/jacket and shoes, hold arms open, and then sternly eyeball me when the one-second burst of air hits, I have always had the impression that it is designed to reveal concealed things under one's clothing. Kind of like asking someone to open their coat, or like a pat-down where the person does not have to touch you.

edit: in a shocking revelation, it looks like I'm wrong. According to this article (http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=1490559&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312), the air blows microscopic particles off your body and the machine then tests the particle for explosives. It's basically a chemical sniffer.

[extarbags]

What TSA is doing is mostly bullshit to make the American public think that the planes are safe. They aren't, so why not get rid of the bullshit and let us get on the plane faster?

Yeah, exactly. Taking off my shoes and taking out my laptop and not bringing liquids don't add up to that big a deal, and I'm happy to do it, only if they don't even do any good, I'd rather not be treated like an imbecile.

In related news, TSA guidelines are hilariously inconsistent in their application. Whether or not they allow contraband on, and what is even considered contraband in the first place, is basically up to the discretion of the individual TSA agent, and they frequently even let you on with things (tools, let's say) that aren't allowed, and they tell you so, and suggest that you not bring them next time. One of my co-workers once managed to board a plane carrying--wait for it--a box cutter.

So yeah, when that kind of stuff is happening, waiting in line for people to untie their shoes starts to seem pretty ridiculous.

[Brad Wardell]

I agree with you but until something else comes along you're sort of boned for destinations that are over a few hundred miles away.

Yea. As a practical reality the difference is that I do a lot more from remote that I might previously have flown there.

[Phil_Stein]

Lorini - how many attempts did they make in order to have 19 successes?

The article does not say (that I can see).

If a city has 19 successful bank robberies in a given year, should the city police abandon all attempts at preventing further robberies?

Must airport security be a 100% or 0% thing? If it ain't perfect, abandon it altogether?

[Blackadar]

edit: in a shocking revelation, it looks like I'm wrong. According to this article (http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=1490559&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312), the air blows microscopic particles off your body and the machine then tests the particle for explosives. It's basically a chemical sniffer.

You just *know* that someone will fall down when the air blows on them, claim it was the wind gust that made them fall and claim an injury. :D

[extarbags]

If a city has 19 successful bank robberies in a given year, should the city police abandon all attempts at preventing further robberies?


No, but they should probably take a look at their current bank-robbery-prevention efforts, because they obviously aren't working all that well. You're using the old "we have to do something, this is something, therefore we have to do this" argument again.

[Phil_Stein]

Extar - 19 successful bank robberies could be excellent or terrible for a city. In a huge city, with a vast number of robbery attempts, 19 of them being successful might actually be pretty good. In Mayberry, 19 might be bad.

Context matters.

Lorini's linked article is weak on context.

I certainly do not say "we have to do something, this is something, therefore we have to do this".

Rather, I say that those who are saying that an established policy is wrong generally bear the burden of proof in showing that it's wrong. Further, when those saying it's wrong have far less information at their disposal than those who formulated the current policy, one should take a particularly skeptical attitude towards the complainers.

[extarbags]

You're right, it doesn't say how many attempts it took to get nineteen through, although I think the answer is strongly implied. But here: the article references a similar test from a year earlier, with basically the same security policies in effect, in which they successfully smuggled bomb makings onto twenty-one flights. It also says how many attempts this took: twenty-one. They were able to do it every time.

If a city of any size implements a bunch of pain-in-the-ass security policies to prevent bank robberies, and then proceeds to have its banks robbed every single time someone tries to do so, then those policies aren't effective, right?

[Phil_Stein]

I missed the reference to the 21 of 21.

OTOH, the relevant quote is "GAO investigators slipped bomb parts past checkpoints in all 21 airports they tested."

"bomb parts" is pretty vague. I'm guessing that there are a bunch of "bomb parts" that also have lots of other ordinary uses, and that the more relevant metric would be something like "key bomb parts" - the explosives in particular.

[extarbags]

Yes, clearly we can't know what the real story is unless the article says the exact words "inspectors went through twenty-one security checkpoints carrying items labelled 'bomb parts' which could be assembled to make bombs using nothing they didn't have with them, and they were not stopped at any of the twenty-one checkpoints."

[Kalle]

Phil, are you being deliberately dense here? Seriously, when your position is this badly undermined it's time to give it up.

[Phil_Stein]

Here's a link (http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/gao_report.pdf) to the 2007 GAO report that I think is the source of the LA Times story.

In turn, on page 3, it briefly mentions the 2006 report with the testing at 21 airports. There's not a lot of detail, and there's a footnote indicating that the 2006 report is classified. It mentions testing at 21 airports, but does not clearly state that bomb parts were successfully smuggled at all 21. Moreover, it mentions that the testing was before the 2006 liquid bomb plot attempt, and before TSA screening procedures for liquids and gels and such were substantially modified. It's hard to say for sure - there's not a lot of detail there, but it seems possible that the bomb part smuggling was of liquids and gels that weren't being heavily screened for at the time, but now are.

As for the 2007 tests, it appears that they did occur at 19 airports. However, it is not clear to me from skimming the GAO report that the security lapses were at all 19 airports. If you see any clear indication that I'm wrong in this assessment, please point it out to me.

Bottom line, it appears to me from a quick skim that the LA Times author transforms tests at 21 and 19 airports respectively, with some failures, into failures at 21 and 19 airports. Maybe I'm reading the GAO report wrong, but I invite you to use the raw GAO report as your source rather than the LA Times article, and figure out if I'm off-base.

[Phil_Stein]

Kalle, you are welcome to read the GAO report as well and reconcile it with whatever interpretation you have of the LA Times article.

[Kraaze]

Has anyone linked this gem yet? (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811/airport-security/2)

Yeah, security theater.

Phil, I don't need a deep analytical report to let me know that the security is an expensive sham when I've seen with my own two eyes a dozen ways I could beat. All it would take is the willingness to put the time and effort into it, and the willingness to risk a lot. Like if I was, say, a terrorist suicide bomber.

[Phil_Stein]

Kraaze - do you think the lack of successful attacks (that I know of) on US-originating airplanes since 9/11 is an indication that there have been no would-be terrorist suicide bombers in the last 8+ years?

Or are they simply far more stupid than you?

[Lorini]

Comparing bank robbers with people who blow up planes (with themselves on the plane) doesn't make sense. Bank robbers don't go into the bank to get money and then die, they go into the bank to get money. People who blow up planes do it for whatever craziness is driving them, knowing that they will die in the process. So if there's an even tiny hole in the security checks, the security checks are useless because they will be exploited. The motivation is completely different.

My suspicion is that travelers' awareness of this potential problem does a lot more than anything the TSA is doing to stop planes from being blown up. Had all the people on the planes on 9/11 realized what the terrorists were going to do, I think there would have been a much different result, just as we saw with the United plane. Also other travelers stopped the idiot with the shoe bomb.

What TSA is doing is a major waste of time and money, and continues to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Bush's response to terrorism.

[BaconTastesGood]

Kraaze - do you think the lack of successful attacks (that I know of) on US-originating airplanes since 9/11 is an indication that there have been no would-be terrorist suicide bombers in the last 8+ years?

Would the lack of successful attacks for the 50+ years prior 9/11 indicate that older security measures were just fine?

[Phil_Stein]

The bank robbers comparison was only basically about the applied use of statistics. Can we reach a conclusion about the effectiveness of a law enforcement agency when we know the numerator (19), but not the denominator?

As it turns out, we don't even know the numerator.

Traveler's awareness goes a long way towards preventing the kind of attacks that occurred on 9/11 (terrorists seizing control of an airplane with the passengers likely staying relatively passive). It is at best a rather mild antidote to some (but not all) bomb-oriented attacks.

Whatever else you want to say about the government response to terrorism, it seems that we have had no successful attacks on US-originating airplanes in over 8 years. On 9/11, 19 terrorists committed a suicide attack against us. I doubt that in the interim, there has been a complete dearth of would-be suicide terrorists. Yet no attacks seem to have occurred. This suggests that it is perhaps not so easy for a would-be suicide terrorist to successfully launch such an attack.

We can certainly debate the effectiveness of individual aspects of our anti-terrorist defenses, (though I still contend that most or maybe all of us know far too little about the risk side of things to discuss this stuff well), but in the aggregate, our defenses seem to have worked, so far.

[Tim Partlett]

edit: in a shocking revelation, it looks like I'm wrong. According to this article (http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=1490559&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312), the air blows microscopic particles off your body and the machine then tests the particle for explosives. It's basically a chemical sniffer.

Ah... that's good to know. I'd never seen one before or since. I was worried that it was blowing me with some kind of mysterious chemical. I'd guessed it was checking for explosives, but I didn't get the mechanics of it :).

[Dave47]

The liquid bomb plotters were arrested before they were able to create a liquid bomb. While they clearly had the intent and the raw materials, liquid explosives are difficult to safely make and are very unstable. Combine that fact with the fact that the liquid ban is easily circumvented and it starts to seem that the lack of a successful liquid bomb plots has less to do with airport security, and more to do with the logistical problems associated with building and deploying a liquid bomb.

We live in an age where deadly bombs can be made out of simple household materials, but honestly, we’ve lived in that age for over a century. The unique situation of airplanes (where a relatively small explosive can cause significant fatalities) probably demands unique security measures compared to, say, a shopping mall. But spending time and effort guarding against liquids diverts time and effort that could be used elsewhere.

If we really want to maximize our security, we need to take a good hard look at what security measures deliver the best return on the effort invested. The liquid ban may not be a massive inconvenience, but it annoys passengers and distracts security officials, is easily foiled, and guards against a type of attack that is possible but that is not plausible.

[Damien Neil]

Note that you are allowed to bring liquid on an airplane in fairly large quantities. It just needs to be in a bottle labeled "saline solution".

Or you could just get one of these (http://www.thebeerbelly.com/).

[Lorini]

I do absolutely support security measures, and some of the measures such as better internal security procedures by airlines, stronger internal doors to the cockpits, and flight marshals on planes have certainly helped discourage terrorists on planes.

OTOH, as Damien showed and my article showed, the TSA security measures at the terminals have not been shown to be effective. The way Phil thinks is that if they haven't been proven to be completely ineffective (which to my mind they have, but he hasn't agreed) then they should be continued, just in case they might be effective. I would rather scrap them entirely for additional security on the planes, and other proven effective ways (they ought to look at security at casinos for example) to keep bomb off of planes.

[Phil_Stein]

If we really want to maximize our security, we need to take a good hard look at what security measures deliver the best return on the effort invested.

Yes.


The liquid ban may not be a massive inconvenience, but it annoys passengers and distracts security officials,

Yes on passengers.

Not really much of an issue with security officials, IMO. They have to screen passengers regardless. Stopping some to point out they are in violation of the liquids rule is not all that different than stopping them for other banned items in their possession.


is easily foiled,

I'm not so sure. Reports that some folks foil this ban, to some extent, aren't all that different from reports that some folks accidentally walk onto an airplane with a gun or knife or whatnot (IIRC, there were such reports after the 9/11 security increase, though they seem to have died down since). Consistently and accurately enforced regulations against dangerous items are best, but even inconsistently and inaccurately enforced regulations have some value.


and guards against a type of attack that is possible but that is not plausible.

I too have heard that liquid explosive devices would be difficult to assemble and detonate. But I'd be very hesitant to say that such an attack is implausible without far more reading and probably access to research that is not readily available on the web or perhaps to the public at large.

[Phil_Stein]

OTOH, as Damien showed and my article showed, the TSA security measures at the terminals have not been shown to be effective.
Read the GSA report. It is not at all clear to me from that report that the security measures are not effective*.

The way Phil thinks is that if they haven't been proven to be completely ineffective (which to my mind they have, but he hasn't agreed) then they should be continued, just in case they might be effective.
No. I think that I (and probably most or all others posting here) don't have enough information to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of various security procedures.

* Edit - I suppose that my sentence is in direct opposition to Lorini's - it's a question of where the burden of proof lies - proving, specifically, that specific security measures ARE effective, or proving that they are NOT effective. IMO, neither has been proved yet, from what I've seen in this thread and the links I've followed from it.

[Phil_Stein]

Also, in fairness I should note that any apparent contradictions between the LA Times article and the GAO report may be due to the fact that the LA Times article seems to be based, at least in part, on testimony before congress, whereas the written report is, well, a written report. It is possible that there was testimony on stuff not in the report.

[RSofaer]

The whole idea that someone could mix explosives in an airplane bathroom without anybody noticing is totally ridiculous. I'm not surprised it's easy to sneak that stuff through, because whoever came up with that bullshit knows it's not important. I don't have references (My URL memory goes back a couple days, not years) but maybe some of the chemists in the house could weigh in. I do know that it would be smelly, extremely likely to explode and blow a minor hole, and frankly, who cares if a plane gets blown up. It's only hijacking that we should be worrying about.

[Lorini]

As I think about this more, it's ridiculous in my opinion, that the US would be depending on a process that is so transparent and so easily manipulated and exploited. What the TSA does at airports is obvious. It's easy to see where the holes are. It's also easy to see who the weak links are in the screening process, the ones who let stuff through anyway, who don't really look at stuff, etc.

That's what makes casino security so good. When you walk into a casino, it looks like everyone is having a great time, yadayadayada. But try causing a problem or not paying or stealing. You'll be surrounded by security you never even saw.

When it's clear what you are trying to do to be 'secure', you're not very secure. The process itself is broken, but it does make everyone think that they are safe, and imo, that's what the government and the airlines in particular most want.

[Houngan]

The whole idea that someone could mix explosives in an airplane bathroom without anybody noticing is totally ridiculous. I'm not surprised it's easy to sneak that stuff through, because whoever came up with that bullshit knows it's not important. I don't have references (My URL memory goes back a couple days, not years) but maybe some of the chemists in the house could weigh in. I do know that it would be smelly, extremely likely to explode and blow a minor hole, and frankly, who cares if a plane gets blown up. It's only hijacking that we should be worrying about.

And if you can smuggle enough liquid on board to cause a problem, why not just smuggle gunpowder and a thermos that is suspiciously made of thick stainless steel instead of thin plastic?

The whole stupid to the security problem is that profiling is the single most effective means to stop terrorism but we're all to scared to use it. People willing to commit mass murder are RARE, damned rare. Couple that with someone who can keep their shit together smuggling explosives onto a plane, and it's a one-in-a-fifty-million or so person that can pull it off. Everyone else is going to be looking shifty in some respect.

Israel doesn't give a damn about profiling, if you don't smell like flowers and have stigmata (I realize this is a terrible religious disjoint) then they are going to fuck with you. And the main purpose is to give you a bit more time to freak out if you actually do have a bag of gunpowder strapped to your leg.

You know what caused 9/11? Our stupid inability to think it would happen. We knew it COULD happen. Fucking Tom Clancey wrote a book about it a few years before, and he wasn't exactly an obscure author at the time. All we had to do was put a real door on a plane for the cockpit, and it doesn't happen at all. What's that, a few thousand per plane? But no, we couldn't be bothered because we were fat, dumb and happy.

Personally, I'm okay with that. Shit happens, and you learn from it. What you don't do is freak out and ruin things for everyone just to look like you're doing something. 9/11? Cockpit doors, no congregating at the front of the plane. Shoe bomber? Sorry to say, I can agree with taking off shoes. It's a minor inconvenience and it discourages copycats. Liquids? Stupid. You aren't testing the liquids, you aren't limiting the quantity in any significant way (I can buy more bottles) and the scenario is laughably complicated and pointless. If I'm willing to kill myself, why wouldn't I be willing to swallow or have implanted enough of something to take out a plane?

Growing up on a farm with a father who liked to reload ammunition for target rifles, we had plenty of access to things that kids should never touch, under supervision. A film canister of black powder is an impressive bang, let me tell you. When you ramp that up to what I could secret about my person easily, then yes, there's a problem.

But our saving grace is that there just aren't that many bad people in the world. More than we want, of course, but it's like child abductions. Is there a risk? Yes. Is there a risk of twenty other things that you should worry about first? Absolutely.

I say bring some Israeli security folks over and let them pull whoever they want out of line for a few months. They're going to bust a HELL of a lot of folks with pot in their bras, and maybe catch a real bad guy or two, but it would be great training and would discourage all but the most Hannibal Lecter-ish of the baddies.

H.

[Houngan]

As I think about this more, it's ridiculous in my opinion, that the US would be depending on a process that is so transparent and so easily manipulated and exploited. What the TSA does at airports is obvious. It's easy to see where the holes are. It's also easy to see who the weak links are in the screening process, the ones who let stuff through anyway, who don't really look at stuff, etc.

That's what makes casino security so good. When you walk into a casino, it looks like everyone is having a great time, yadayadayada. But try causing a problem or not paying or stealing. You'll be surrounded by security you never even saw.

When it's clear what you are trying to do to be 'secure', you're not very secure. The process itself is broken, but it does make everyone think that they are safe, and imo, that's what the government and the airlines in particular most want.

Another good point. The way to get the bad guys to tip their hand is to let them think they're being watched constantly, rather than having one big area to pass and then relax.

H.

[CheesyPoof]

They have these in McCarren airport (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA) as well. From the fact that they make me take off any coat/jacket and shoes, hold arms open, and then sternly eyeball me when the one-second burst of air hits, I have always had the impression that it is designed to reveal concealed things under one's clothing. Kind of like asking someone to open their coat, or like a pat-down where the person does not have to touch you.

edit: in a shocking revelation, it looks like I'm wrong. According to this article (http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=1490559&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312), the air blows microscopic particles off your body and the machine then tests the particle for explosives. It's basically a chemical sniffer.

Ah... that's good to know. I'd never seen one before or since. I was worried that it was blowing me with some kind of mysterious chemical. I'd guessed it was checking for explosives, but I didn't get the mechanics of it :).

They're called puffer machines, and they sucked so they've gone bye bye (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-05-20-puffers_N.htm?csp=Travel).

The TSA sucks and needs to be overhauled. I long for a security scan like the one in Total Recall.

[Houngan]

They're called puffer machines, and they sucked so they've gone bye bye (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-05-20-puffers_N.htm?csp=Travel).

The TSA sucks and needs to be overhauled. I long for a security scan like the one in Total Recall.

Really? I went through on of those things on my way to Panama. Frankly I was surprised it didn't register positive, my house is impregnated with explosive residue at this point.

H.

[RyanMichael]

I love that they spent all this money on machines that completely suck at what they're supposed to do and break down frequently. Where's the accountability to sue these crappy manufacturers to get our tax dollars back? Why do we have to eat the cost from TSA's bad purchase from a crappy vendor?

[Robert Sharp]

That's what makes casino security so good. When you walk into a casino, it looks like everyone is having a great time, yadayadayada. But try causing a problem or not paying or stealing. You'll be surrounded by security you never even saw.

When it's clear what you are trying to do to be 'secure', you're not very secure. The process itself is broken, but it does make everyone think that they are safe, and imo, that's what the government and the airlines in particular most want.

How do you know that's not happening in airports? I'm not being facetious, either. Hidden security is hidden. (tautologies are tautologies!)

As for the liquids, I think Dave47 is right. The proof that such an attack is implausible is that it hasn't happened. It would be pretty easy to smuggle liquids onto a plane. AFAIK, we don't have a way to scan for them.

[Lorini]

Robert, it absolutely could be happening in airports. I hope it is. But that doesn't justify the obvious TSA security at terminals.

[Mark Weston]

It's always nice to know that there are a million internet posters who can defeat airport security with one hand tied behind their back. But interestingly the actual terrorists seem quite a lot more risk-averse. Deterrence clearly does affect terrorist behaviour, otherwise recent plots would have involved guns and bombs instead of craft knives and soft-drink based chemistry experiments.

[WarrenM]

Any links to studies or articles that show that terrorists are being deterred by the TSA official looking inside people's shoes?

[Lloyd Heilbrunn]

On my way back from my last vacation, I forgetfully put some of my fishing gear in my carryon rather than checking it. Who knew security would think I could hijack a plane with a spinning reel and fishing lure?

Ok, the lure had little hooks, but the reel was also forbbiden, why??

[Tankero]

You can use it to garrote people. This has a silence debuff attached, so they can't yell for help while you build more combo points.

[Houngan]

On my way back from my last vacation, I forgetfully put some of my fishing gear in my carryon rather than checking it. Who knew security would think I could hijack a plane with a spinning reel and fishing lure?

Ok, the lure had little hooks, but the reel was also forbbiden, why??

Just to piss you off, I had no trouble carrying on a three-pound cornered slab of hardwood on my last flight, so any blunt-force argument is instantly moot.

H.

[Lloyd Heilbrunn]

You can use it to garrote people. This has a silence debuff attached, so they can't yell for help while you build more combo points.

With 4 lb. test??

[Tankero]

Yes.

5

[Andrew Mayer]

So for those of you who hate Air Travel, we can agree that not all deregulation is good, yes?

[Jakub]

Amusingly, Israel has much better security and much less security theatre.
I'm not so sure about that. One time on my way back from E3 I flew on Israeli airlines and the experience was rather intimidating. It was like crossing the East German border. Where are you going, why, when did you leave, when did you come back, how do you feel about Jews, do you deny the Holocaust, where are you originally from, you're Polish, oh ho! did you family harbor or sell out Jews during the war, do you believe in Palestinian independence, etc.

Granted, this was like just over a year after 9/11 but I did not enjoy the experience.

[Reldan]

While I agree it might be difficult to create an actual liquid explosive to blow a plane up, what about mixing together liquids to create toxic gases? That's seems deadly and significantly easier since such chemicals are more stable.

[Pogo]

One of my co-workers once managed to board a plane carrying--wait for it--a box cutter.

I flew to Europe in 2003 and did not mistakenly leave a box cutter and a firecracker in my bookbag and get through airport security.

This didn't* happen. The fact that I'm writing this post is proof that it didn't happen.

Pretty much blew my freaking mind when I didn't find those things after getting to my destination.

[BaconTastesGood]

I transported a nasty looking knife through security several times before getting 'caught' -- I had no idea it was in my laptop bag (I mean, WHY THE HELL would I have ever put a Spyderco in a LAPTOP BAG DESIGNED FOR TRAVEL?! I honestly cannot imagine any scenario in which I would have said to myself "Hmmm, where should I put this knife? I know, RIGHT IN THIS CARRY ON BAG."). When it got discovered I figured it was a random search and was like "LOL, ok, knock yourself out" and when he pulled that out I could literally feel the blood drain from my face.

Of course, it wasn't a big deal, he was like "Do you want to dispose of this or exit the line and send it home?" That was it (I disposed of it sadly), then went on like nothing happened.

[AaronSofaer]

I'm not so sure about that. One time on my way back from E3 I flew on Israeli airlines and the experience was rather intimidating. It was like crossing the East German border. Where are you going, why, when did you leave, when did you come back, how do you feel about Jews, do you deny the Holocaust, where are you originally from, you're Polish, oh ho! did you family harbor or sell out Jews during the war, do you believe in Palestinian independence, etc.

Granted, this was like just over a year after 9/11 but I did not enjoy the experience.


Yeah, but I'm talking more about people pulling you over and giving you a hard time over carrying a laptop.

I've spent plenty of time with Israeli security, they like to interrogate you even if you speak Hebrew and know who you're visiting and everything. But can you really say that there's more security theater (as opposed to actual security) there, rather than in the States, where they freak out over laptops and let you get through with actually dangerous shit?

Maybe I'm just bitter.

[Dean]

Penn Jillette proposed Bacon and a Kiss Airline:

Penn stated interest in starting a "bacon and a kiss" airline. He theorized that you can avoid invasive airport security by requiring eating bacon and kissing someone of the same gender on the genitals, and therefore screening out religious fundamentalists. Apart from those restrictions, you can carry anything you feel like onto the plane without any other security checks. Penn has also added that another way to weed out fundamentalist Muslims was to have them pray to another deity, or to draw a picture and label it Mohammad.

He said if you didn't want to do any of those things, you could submit to ID checks and cavity searches.

[Jason McCullough]

Seeing how the 9/11 hijackers went to a strip club before their missions, somehow I don't think that'd work.

[RSofaer]

The thing about Israeli security is that intimidating random people and profiling their reactions and subsequent behavior might actually make you secure.

[Linoleum]

El Al methods don't scale well.