Helmand offensive continues (Afghanistan), 1 US serviceman captured

[Lizard_King]

A relatively large offensive in one of Afghanistan's most troublesome provinces has taken a twist (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8130476.stm), and apparently the "soldier" (unclear what branch or occupational specialty he belonged to) was not a part of combat operations at the time. Much of it is rumor apart from the capture itself, but the fact remains that being captured in a war where neither side has any compunctions about ignoring Geneva is not a good place to be.

[Rimbo]

The Taliban are claiming he was drunk when they caught him, he says.
There is no indication he became separated during a firefight - rather that he wandered off out of his base with the three Afghans, our correspondent adds.

Interesting...

[Saiban]

One Marine KIA confirmed (http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5605Z120090702?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0) so far.

Obviously I'm not there on the ground, but it sounds like they're following the same sort of clear/hold strategy as in Iraq. To 'hold' everything, they have to be in contact with as much of the population as possible -- I think I read in a previous article that they're doing platoon-sized deployments to villages and hamlets. Which of course means they'll be more tempting targets for the enemy. In Iraq, there was a huge surge in violence as the insurgents tried to push the US troops back out and away from the population. Dunno if it will work out the same way in Afghanistan, but if it does there will be a lot more casualties, on both sides. But hopefully a lot more for the Taliban.

EDIT: Another interesting thing about these latest moves, at least from the standpoint of the Marines, is that in many ways they're returning to something which seemed to be buried in history, the Combined Action Program (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program).

[Rimbo]

Obviously I'm not there on the ground, but it sounds like they're following the same sort of clear/hold strategy as in Iraq. To 'hold' everything, they have to be in contact with as much of the population as possible -- I think I read in a previous article that they're doing platoon-sized deployments to villages and hamlets. Which of course means they'll be more tempting targets for the enemy.

That would make sense, since Petraeus (IIRC) is now in charge.

[Incendiary Lemon]

EDIT: Another interesting thing about these latest moves, at least from the standpoint of the Marines, is that in many ways they're returning to something which seemed to be buried in history, the Combined Action Program.

The doctrine is pretty old. What we did in Vietnam and what we're doing now we learned from the French and their experience with Colonial Wars.

[Saiban]

The doctrine is pretty old. What we did in Vietnam and what we're doing now we learned from the French and their experience with Colonial Wars.

Certainly the French experiences in Algeria and Indochina were useful, but mostly as an example of what NOT to do. One of the problems the US had in Vietnam was that it, for the most part, didn't learn from any previous experience. The British in Malaya, and the Filipino government fighting the Huks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hukbalahap), both gave a blueprint of how to fight and win an insurgency in a rural, jungle setting. The US military as a whole pretty much ignored that completely until 1970-1. The US Marine Corps incorporated some lessons from those conflicts, but also from their experiences in other counter-insurgency type conflicts in Latin America and in the Philippines at the beginning of the century, earlier than the rest of the military, but on a small scale.

[Rimbo]

I think, also, that the US military learned a thing or two from the British when they were fighting side-by-side in Iraq, as the British had had to learn how to fight the IRA successfully. One trick they learned that we STILL haven't learned is not to honor terrorists by calling them terrorists; you treat someone who sets off a bomb as a murderer, a common criminal. Because that's what they are.

[Incendiary Lemon]

Certainly the French experiences in Algeria and Indochina were useful, but mostly as an example of what NOT to do.

I wouldn't agree with that completely. The French doctrine often failed them, garrisons that remained in their bunkers and did not patrol were quite useless and served to diminish striking power. The French also never had the logistics to support their forces on the ground. Still, what they learned in the Vietnam they put to good use in Algeria. Politically by 56 any effort to keep Algeria in France was doomed. The pied nors and Paris had failed to make concessions to the Algerians when they had the chance. Militarily though the French proved themselves more than capable. They managed to destroy the FLN as an effective force and end the insurgency.

If you haven't read them before David Galula's Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958 is superb although you might be better served by Sir Alistair Horne's A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962